Section 346 of the Internal Revenue Code: A Legislative Enigma by Schoettle, Ferdinand P., Jr.
[VoL109
SECTION 346 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE:
A LEGISLATIVE ENIGMA
FERDIwAND P. SCBOETTE, J .t
Although the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 has not yet sur-
vived its first decade and cases construing many of its provisions are
just beginning to reach the courts, Congressman Mills, chairman of
the House Committee on Ways and Means, has already called for aid
in proposing a complete revision of the Code. Among the Code's
provisions for which revision has been suggested is section 346, the
so-called corporate contraction section. That provision, through its
definition of section 331's "partial liquidation," provides for capital
gains treatment of certain corporate distributions to shareholders
"characterized by what happens solely at the corporate level by reason
of the assets distributed ..... I When enacted, section 346 was
intended to codify existing law.
Despite the tenure of the concept of a corporate contraction as an
event giving rise to taxation at other than ordinary income rates, the
validity of the principles which section 346 attempts to articulate has
been repeatedly attacked on the ground that "the corporate contrac-
tion" is a concept without meaning: the distributions in question are
usually pro rata among the shareholders, and the effect of allowing
taxation at capital gains rates is to provide an avenue for the avoidance
of tax. These critics suggest elimination rather than revision of the
corporate contraction concept.2 The proposed statutory changes, how-
ever, not only perpetuate the concept, but seem to contemplate its
increased vigor.
This Article will first analyze the pre-1954 statutory and case
law with a view to posing the problem which faced Congress in 1954
and will then consider section 346 itself. Finally, the proposed modi-
fications and other legislative schemes will be investigated.
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STATUTORY AND CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT
The Legislative Genesis of Section 346
Section 346 had its legislative origin in a series of general statutes
directed to determining the proper taxation of distributions from a
corporation to its shareholders. Prior to 1924 no statutory reference
was made to partial liquidations as such. The Revenue Act of 1913
taxed "dividends" but failed to define the term.3 Supreme Court
decisions indicated, however, that a complete liquidation was not a
dividend 4 and intimated that transactions where stock was surrendered
might be considered differently from situations where this factor was
not present." The 1916 act defined "dividend" as any distribution out
of post-1913 earnings and profits and thus seemingly obviated any
other treatment when property passed from a prosperous corporation
to its stockholders.' Despite this all-inclusive definition, however, it is
not clear that the Treasury actually utilized this approach when stock
was surrendered in return for funds. This can be illustrated by refer-
ence to Treasury practice under the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921.
The 1918 act made no provision for partial liquidations, but
provided that amounts distributed in the liquidation of a corporation
were to be treated as payments "in exchange" for stock.' The Revenue
Act of 1921 merely stated that any distribution from earnings and
profits was a dividend.' Treasury practice, if not the tax rates, with
respect to partial liquidations was the same under both these acts.
Until 1936, dividends were subject to the surtax but not to the normal
tax, probably on the theory that the earnings and profits of the cor-
poration had already been taxed once at the corporate level and should
not be subject to a double tax. With partial liquidations the Treasury
regarded only the gain as taxable, evidently assuming that the taxpayer
was entitled to a return of his basis of the stock redeemed."0 Under
this last assumption it would have been possible under both the 1918
and 1921 Revenue Acts for the stockholder to contend that the entire
distribution should be taxed to him at the dividend (surtax) rate, but
3 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 3, § 2(b), 38 Stat. 167.
4 Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S. 221 (1918).
5 Cf. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 341 (1918).
a Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 757.
7 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 201(c), 40 Stat. 1059.
8 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(c), 42 Stat. 228.
0 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 216(a), 42 Stat. 242.
10 I.T. 1543, 1I-I Cum. BuL.. 17 (1923) (Revenue Act of 1921); A.R.M. 93,
3 Cum. BULL. 40 (1920) (Revenue Act of 1918). See Kurz, Partial Liquidations of
Corporations-An Analysis, National Income Tax Magazine, July 1924, p. 199;
Magill, The Income Tax Liability of Dividends in Liquidation, 23 MicH. L. REV. 565,
579, 584 (1925).
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that the basis of the stock should be allowed as a deduction against
income subject to both normal and surtax rates." Under the 1921 act
it seems clear that the gain involved was taxed at only the surtax
rate; 1 under the 1918 act Treasury practice was to tax the gain as a
"part liquidation" at the exchange (normal and surtax) rate.'3
Whether this latter treatment was authorized by the statute is open to
question.14
Whatever the legislative sanction for taxing gains in "part liquida-
tion" at the nondividend rate, the stockholder during this early period
was able to utilize the partial liquidation in order to withdraw funds
from the corporation without the payment of any tax. Although the
Treasury has attempted to maintain the logically impeccable position
that the stock surrendered in a partial liquidation should bear a correla-
tion to the assets distributed, and has been successful with this position
in the Tax Court,'5 it seems probable that throughout this entire
period-and indeed perhaps today also '--the stockholder controlled
not only the selection of high or low basis stock for redemption but
also the number of shares to be redeemed. Thus "gain" could be
avoided to a large extent.
The Revenue Act of 1924 sanctioned prior Treasury practice by
providing that partial and complete liquidations were to be taxed as
"in exchange," thus making them-as a usual rule-subject to both
the normal tax and the surtax.'7  But under section 208 the taxpayer
was able to limit his capital gains rate to 12.5 per cent; 18 thus a partial
liquidation might for the wealthy stockholder produce a better result
than a dividend, which might be subject, as ordinary income, to a sur-
tax rate in excess of 12.5 per cent.
Taxation of the gain from partial liquidations at capital gain
rates continued until the Revenue Act of 1934, which provided that
gains in partial and complete liquidations should be taxed as short-
11Magill, supra note 10; cf. Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 667 (1932).
12 I.T. 1543, I-1 Cum. BuLL. 17 (1923).
's A.R.M. 93, 3 Cum. BuLL. 40 (1920) (taxing as "income"); O.D. 479, 2 Cum.
BuLL. 29 (1920) (taxing as "sale" in "part liquidation"); O.D. 488, 2 Cum. BULL. 29
(1920). The Treasury Regulations were equivocal and did not seem to deal with
partial liquidations. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1548 (1920), as amended, T.D. 3206, 5 Cum.
Bu.L. 46 (1921).
14The statutory phrase "amounts distributed in the liquidation" might have been
strictly construed to avoid "double taxation" in those situations, such as partial
liquidations, where the language was not clearly applicable. Cf. Hellmich v. Hellman,
18 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1927), rev'd, 276 U.S. 233 (1928).
15 Malone v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1942), reversing 45 B.T.A. 305
(1941) ; Orie R. Kelly, 36 B.T.A. 507 (1937), rev'd, 97 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1938).
16 See, e.g., Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948).
17 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(c), 43 Stat. 255.
Is Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 208, 43 Stat. 262.
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term capital gains.19 The reason advanced for this treatment was that
wealthy shareholders had been able to avoid the surtax rates through
resort to favorable capital gains treatment." The committee report
noted, however, that the matter was disputable since distributions in
liquidation contained some of the characteristics of sales as well as of
dividends.2 Though the 1936 act restored complete liquidations to
capital gain status,22 it was not until 1942 that similar treatment was
extended to partial liquidations.2 3  In making the 1942 change, the
committee noted that the short-term capital gain treatment had been
originally adopted to prevent ordinary dividends from being dis-
tributed at capital gains rates. It expressed a belief that section 115(g)
of the act would suffice to prevent "distributions in partial liquidation
from being utilized to disguise the taxation of a taxable dividend." 24
The section to which the committee referred provided for dividend
treatment of distributions in partial liquidation when a corporation
cancelled or redeemed its stock in "such manner as to make the dis-
tribution . . . essentially equivalent to a distribution of a taxable
dividend." 25 Although this section was contained in the same portion
of the statute as the liquidation provisions discussed above and would
seem to have provided a ready guide in the interpretation of "partial
liquidation," such was not the case. Section 115 (g) had its origins in
the problems presented by Eisner v. Macomber 2 and was not initially
conceived as a corollary to the treatment of partial liquidations.
After the Court held in Eisner that a stock dividend could not be taxed,
Congress-apparently concerned that a corporation could distribute a
"tax free" stock dividend and subsequently redeem stock-provided in
section 201 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1921 that redemption of stock
subsequent to a stock dividend would be subject to dividend taxation
where such redemption was "essentially equivalent" to a dividend.
Section 201 (d) seems to have been ill-conceived inasmuch as the prior
issuance of a stock dividend has little, or nothing, to do with the
question of benefit to the shareholder upon redemption of stock: a
stock dividend itself adds nothing to a shareholder's claim, and the
19 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 115(c), 48 Stat. 711.
20H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1934); S. REP. No. 558, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1934).
21 Ibid.
22 Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 115(c), 49 Stat. 1687.
23 See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 147, 56 Stat. 841.
24 H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1942) ; S. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1942).
25 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(g), 53 Stat. 48.
26252 U.S. 189 (1920).
27 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 201(d), 42 Stat. 228.
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existence vel non of a stock dividend prior to a redemption does not
affect either the amount of cash received by the shareholder or his
proportionate interest in the corporation following the redemption.
The Revenue Act of 1924 did nothing to clarify this situation
when it provided that a redemption would be subjected to the criterion
of "dividend equivalency" when made "before or after" the distribu-
tion of a stock dividend.28 In the 1926 act, both section 201 (g) and
its legislative history seemed to reflect a congressional understanding
of the method by which a partial liquidation could achieve the same
effect as a dividend. The section provided that partial liquidations
were to be treated as dividends whenever "essentially equivalent"
thereto; 29 and the legislative history expressed an intent to prevent
tax avoidance and gave a hypothetical case to aid in future inter-
pretation.30
The Treasury Regulations
This post-1926 statutory scheme seemed to be conducive to the
development of well-elaborated treasury regulations which would aid
counsel and courts in the application of such general criteria as whether
a distribution was "essentially equivalent to the distribution of a tax-
able dividend." Unfortunately, no such regulations were ever promul-
gated. Those originally promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1926
were of no aid, merely reciting that the determination was one which
depended "upon the circumstances of each case."" Regulations pub-
lished in 1931 offered some help by attempting to identify the polar
cases. They said that cancellation of stock pro rata would "generally
be considered as effecting a distribution essentially equivalent to a
28 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 201(f), 43 Stat. 255. On its face "before or
after" could have been broadly construed. However, the legislative history dearly
supported a narrow construction. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, 49
(1924); S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924); STAFF OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON FINANCE, 68TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STATEMENT OF CHANGES MADE IN THE
REVENUE ACT OF 1921 BY H.R. 6715 AND THE REASONS T mEFOE 4 (Conmm. Print
1924).
29 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §201(g), 44 Stat. 11.
30H.R. REP,. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1925). The report said: "It has
been contended that under existing law a corporation, especially one which has only
a few stockholders, might be able to make a distribution to its stockholders which
would have the same effect as a taxable dividend. For example: Assume that two
men hold practically all the stock in a corporation, for which each had paid $50,000
in cash, and the corporation had accumulated a surplus of $50,000 above its cash
capital. It is claimed that under existing law the corporation could buy from the
stockholders, for cash, one-half of the stock held by them and cancel it without
making the stockholders subject to any tax. Yet this action, in all essentials, would
be the equivalent of a distribution through cash dividends of the earned surplus. The
amendment proposed to this subdivision is intended to make clear that such a transac-
tion is taxable." See also S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1926).
3'Treas. Reg. 69, art. 1549 (1926).
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dividend distribution," and that complete termination of a share-
holder's interest did "not effect a distribution of a taxable dividend." 32
Because of the anemia of the term "generally" and the regulations'
further statement that the determination was one to be made "upon
the circumstances of each case," these regulations-which remained
substantially unchanged until 1954 33 -provided little guidance for the
courts.
Partial Liquidation in the Courts
As can be expected from the confusing circumstances attending
the enactment of section 2 01(g) of the Revenue Act of 1926, the
courts experienced extreme difficulties in determining which partial
liquidations to treat as dividends. From 1934 to 1942-when partial
liquidations were not subject to favorable tax status-the courts, in
addition to determining dividend equivalency, concerned themselves
with the question of whether every situation where a stockholder sur-
rendered stock to his corporation was a partial liquidation or whether
the taxpayer might not be deemed to have "sold" the stock. Many
courts did indicate that a stockholder could "sell" stock to his cor-
poration." The approach, once adopted, might have been utilized to
develop criteria similar to those contained in present section 302.35
However, no such criteria were evolved; instead the irrelevant dis-
tinction between stock that was cancelled and that held as treasury
stock was made determinative of tax consequences. It is questionable
whether there was any rational basis for considering treasury stock as
having been sold; 3' certainly there does not seem to have been any
justification in the statutory language. Fortunately, this distinction,
once adopted and carried to its ultimate extreme, appears to have been
finally rejected."
32 Treas. Reg. 74, art. 629 (1931) (issued under the Revenue Act of 1928).
83 Compare ibid. with Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.115(g)-1(a) (1953).
34 See, e.g., Amelia H. Cohen Trust v. Commissioner, 121 F2d 689, 691 (3d
Cir. 1941) (dictum).
35 In Phelps v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
85 U.S. 558 (1932), the Seventh Circuit distinguished the case on appeal, where
the stock had been redeemed pro rata, from a hypothetical case where a single stock-
holder disposed of his shares to the corporation by indicating thaf in such a case
there would be no intention of all the shareholders to liquidate. William A. Smith,
38 B.T.A. 317 (1938), acq., 1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 34, withdrawing previous nonacq. in
1939-1 Cum. BuLL. 63, was a case such as that hypothesized in Phelps. The Board
quoted the Phelps dictum but relied primarily on the fact that the stock in the case
before it was carried as treasury stock after its acquisition by the corporation which
had not been the case in Phelps.
36 One author felt that it was not a wholly irrational distinction during the
period when corporations carried treasury shares as assets and were taxed upon
"income" derived from dealing in their own shares. Darrell, Corporate Liquidations
and the Federal Income Tax, 89 U. PA. L. Rmv. 907, 912 (1941).
37 See Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651, 655 (1st Cir. 1954) ; Boyle v. Commissioner,
187 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951); Wall v. United
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Equivalency to a Dividend?
The genesis of the statutory section and the lack of any clear
criteria as to what Congress considered relevant in determining "divi-
dend equivalency" gave rise to a host of apparently conflicting decisions.
Despite the efforts of various authors to give content to this area of
the law, usually by arguing that dividend equivalency was solely a
question of the proportional nature of the distribution,8 the courts
have failed to adopt any such approach and as recently as 1957 a lower
court referred to "the nightmarish problem that arises from the terms
and court interpretations of such terms of Section llS(g) . . ." .
However, the criteria used in determining dividend equivalency
have changed with time and if all cases are not regarded as expository
of "the law," it is possible to expound this development.40
The cases, even after the Revenue Act of 1926, equated the con-
ception of "dividend equivalency" to the Eisner v. Macomber 41 situa-
tion which had evoked the enactment of section 201 (g). Thus it was
thought that the section should be inapplicable to redemptions of stock
other than dividend stock which had not been issued for a valid busi-
ness purpose.42 Indeed, in the 1932 case of Pearl B. Brown,43 the
Board of Tax Appeals noted that "the only equivalence to a dividend is
that the shareholders received a cash distribution from the corporation,
as they would have done if a dividend had been declared and paid."
Because the post-1926 statutory scheme seemed no longer directed
to this limited approach, the courts gradually abandoned it.
45  Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Bedford,46 decided under a different but related statu-
tory provision, added a needed catalyst by intimating that dividend
equivalency should be correlated to the existence of earnings and
States, 164 F.2d 462, 465 (4th Cir. 1947) ; Harry Banner, 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 342
(1945), aff'd on other grounds sub non. Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d
23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 726 (1946). The Second Circuit, however, may
still cling to this distinction for cases arising under the 1939 Code. See Kirschenbaum
v. Commissioner, supra at 24-25 (dictum). Section 317(b) would seem to preclude
this approach under the 1954 Code.
38 See, e.g., Bittner & Redlich, supra note 2, at 460-61.
39Wilson v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 341, 342 (N.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd,
257 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 893 (1958).
40 See Woodworth v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 719, 723 (6th Cir. 1955)
(Stewart, J.).
41252 U.S. 189 (1920).
42 See, e.g., Patty v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 717, 719 (2d Cir. 1938) (L. Hand, J.).
The Second Circuit was perhaps the chief exponent of this limited approach.
4326 B.T.A. 901 (1932), aff'd, 69 F.2d 602 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S.
570 (1934).
44 26 B.T.A. at 909.
45 See Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
46 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
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profits.Y7 The terms of section 115 seemed to obviate such an equa-
tion, however, and the courts continued an approach which, while con-
sidering a prolixity of factors,4" placed primary emphasis upon the
motives which prompted the distribution in question, as well as its
pro rata nature.
49
To divide these cases into two clearly delineated groups, the one
reflecting the distribution at the shareholder level, the other at the
corporate level, is an impossible task. A number of early cases, adopt-
ing the restrictive view of section 115 utilized a "corporate contrac-
tion" as evidence of a non-tax-avoidance motive.50 Among more
recent cases, some can be selected which are usually classified under
the rubric of corporate contraction. They seem to differ from other
cases finding dividend equivalency only in the magnitude of the dis-
tribution and in the fact that the distribution-rather than being
solely from current earnings-arose to some extent from the diminu-
tion of the operations or planned operations of the corporation.
In three cases, the distribution amounted to almost all the operat-
ing assets of the corporation and a large amount of the corporation's
cash. In L. M. Lockhart,51 the sole shareholder of the Lockhart Oil
Company of Texas received assets with a net value of $967,265.59,
leaving the corporation with a single rig carried at $33,938.93 on
the corporate books. The corporation had been kept in existence be-
cause the taxpayer wished to continue the corporate name and because
a prior divorce agreement seemed to contemplate the corporation's
continued life. The assets distributed were largely producing assets
which the taxpayer hoped to immunize from the possible tort liability
of a drilling operation. Judge Disney noted that the Treasury's
47 See Kirschenbaum v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 726 (1946).
4 8 See United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Pacific Vegetable
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1957); Earle v. Woodlaw, 245
F.2d 119 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 942 (1947); Annot., 170 A.L.R 1392
(1947).
49 See note 48 supra. The Second Circuit seems to have completed its cycle and
now places very little emphasis upon motivation. See Northrup v. United States,
240 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1957). This so-called business-purpose approach seems to have
special validity in jury cases. Probably this is because the judge is unwilling to
direct a verdict and can find no other terms in which to place the case before the
jury. See United States v. Fewell, supra note 48; Keefe v. Cote, 213 F.2d 651, 657
(1st Cir. 1954); Wilson v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 341, 342 (N.D.N.Y. 1957),
aff'd, 257 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 893 (1958); Griffin v. Jones,
53-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 48197 (W.D. Okla. 1952), aff'd, 216 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1954).
50 See Commissioner v. Champion, 78 F.2d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 1935); Commis-
sioner v. Babson, 70 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.) (semble), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 571 (1934) ;
Commissioner v. Brown, 69 F.2d 602 (7th Cir.) (semble), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 570
(1934); Alfred E. Fuhlage, 32 B.T.A. 222, petition to review dimissed, 79 F.2d 998
(8th Cir. 1935); Robert R. Meyer, 27 B.T.A. 44 (1932), nonacq., 1934-1 Cum.
BuLL. 26. But see McGuire v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 431 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 591 (1936).
518 T.C. 436 (1947).
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definition of a dividend as a "distribution in the ordinary course of
business" was not illuminating in the case, and thought that a dividend
could be found in some cases where the distribution was not in the
ordinary course of business. But the opinion of the court is not
otherwise helpful. The transaction was denominated a partial liquida-
tion because of the valid "business purpose" prompting distribution
of the assets-here because they could be better operated as a partner-
ship, and because the taxpayer assumed the liabilities of the corpora-
tion. Estate of Vannie E. Cook 52 and Favrot v. Scofield 5 are
factually similar.
The majority of the cases present fact situations where a cor-
poration has sold or distributed a large portion of its assets-usually
about forty per cent of net worth. An interesting case is that of Com-
missioner v. Sullivan,4 where the corporation redeemed forty per cent
of its stock pro rata. The corporation, which had never paid a
regular dividend, distributed assets consisting of leases, producing
wells, drilling equipment, notes of the taxpayer previously given to the
corporation in the amount of $250,000, and an account receivable of
$1,050,000. The assets distributed had a net market value of
$1,259,036.27, which exceeded the accumulated earnings.5 Subse-
quent to the distribution the drilling equipment was transferred to a
new corporation and the remaining assets were operated in partner-
ship form. In holding section l15(g) inapplicable, both the Tax
Court and the majority of the court of appeals emphasized that the
corporation did not wish to develop the leases in question because of a
prior blowout. Very little emphasis was placed upon any corporate
contraction theory as such and the opinions in both courts read simi-
larly to those cases, decided before Estate of Bedford, which had taken
the narrow view of section ll5(g)'s function-although the Tax
Court did note that the result followed whether regard be had to the
motives and purposes of the corporation or to the net effect of the
transaction.5
Judge Rives of the Fifth Circuit in a strong dissent contended
that dividend equivalency should have been found, not only because
of the pro rata nature of the distribution, but also because even if the
majority desired to use an approach which allowed distribution at
5213 CCH Tax Ct. Mein. 822 (1954).
53 53-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 48070 (W.D. Tex. 1953).
54210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954), affirming 17 T.C. 1420 (1952), acq. in part,
1953-2 Cum. BuLL. 6.
551d. at 611 (dissenting opinion). Earnings and profits were disputed and
amounted to either $905,217.95 or $359,878.24.
5617 T.C. 1420, 1424 (1952).
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capital gain rates when prompted by a business purpose, there was no
such reason to support the distribution of the nonproducing assets.
In Samuel A. Upham,57 the Brownville Paper Company re-
deemed forty per cent of its outstanding stock for $160 per share "
at a total cost of $320,000. The reasons given for the redemption were
that the corporation had been planning an expansion and that in 1941,
because of the advanced age of the stockholders and the prospective
sale of the corporation, this plan was abandoned. The corporation
therefore sold $320,000 worth of securities from its investment port-
folio, which had been accumulated in order to finance the expansion
and distributed the proceeds in a pro rata redemption. During the
preceding seven years, net earnings totalled $490,429.15 and
$335,700 had been distributed as dividends. The accumulated
earnings and profits were more than sufficient to make the total dis-
tribution a dividend. This court unquestionably adopted a restrictive
view of the application of section 115(g), stating:
It is apparent that if the redemption was merely a step in a plan
to distribute earnings and profits to stockholders or if it was de-
signed for the benefit of the stockholders, the time and manner
of the distribution would be essentially equivalent to a taxable
dividend. . . . However, if the redemption was dictated by the
reasonable needs of the corporate business, section 115 (g) would
not apply. 
9
In finding no dividend equivalency, the court emphasized the business
purposes which had prompted the accumulation. 0
Heber Scowcroft mIv. Co.' presents a case where a corporation,
formed in 1893, had over a period of years reinvested earnings and
profits in order to expand into a number of different operations.
The first redemption of stock occurred in 1931, when twenty-five
674 T.C. 1120 (1945), acq., 1945 Cum. ButL. 7.
58 The price reflected the market value of the shares. 4 T.C. at 1127.
59 Ibid.
60 The Upham case has been considered by some to be contrary to E. M. Peet,
43 B.T.A. 852 (1941). It should not necessarily be so considered. In the Peet case
the corporation revised expansionary plans and proceeded to redeem 2,500 of 25,000
outstanding shares at par value ($10.00). The corporation had $162,602.44 cash on
hand after the pro rata redemption; despite large accumulated earnings and profits
no dividends had been paid for five years; net income for the two years preceding
the redemption was $26,540.28. The relationship between recently retained earnings
and the distribution in partial liquidation would facilitate a finding of dividend
equivalency.
614 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 755 (1945). There are other more recent cases having
similar facts. Because these cases were not considered by Congress in drafting the
1954 Code, they will not be discussed within the confines of this Article. For a
case which adopts a strict view, see Estate of Charles D. Chandler, 22 T.C. 1158
(1954), aff'd, 228 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1955) (per curiam). But see Estate of Abraham
Frisch, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEm. DEc. 59074 (1959).
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per cent of the stock was retired pro rata, allegedly because of funds
freed when credit terms were reduced. By 1939 the company, which
had originated as a wholesaler and jobber of merchandise consisting
primarily of dry goods and groceries, manufactured overalls and dress
goods, operated a canning business, and had retail outlets for its
goods. In that year it was decided to discontinue all but the original
wholesaling and jobbing operations. The articles of incorporation
were amended and thirty per cent of the outstanding stock was retired
pro rata at its then market value of sixty dollars per share. In all,
3,556 shares were retired for $213,360. The stock was evidently re-
deemed before all the assets were sold.62 The court, impressed by the
company's dividend record and the fact that "the transaction was
motivated by sound business reasons," 63 held for the taxpayers.
A final corporate contraction case worthy of note is Joseph W.
Imler.64  The Imler Supply Company owned one seven-story brick
building and four smaller buildings. The company, which was in the
retinning and soldering business, leased the major portion of its space.
In 1942 when a fire destroyed the top two floors of the main building,
the company used about one-half of the insurance proceeds of $28,603
to place a roof over the fifth floor of the building. Thereafter the
company discontinued its soldering business and redeemed 300 out of
654 outstanding shares for $50 each. At the time of the distribution
the balance sheet showed "accumulated earned surplus" of $37,094.89,
but the company had operated at a net loss since 1932 and had only
two profitable years during this entire period. No dividends had been
paid since 1934. Judge Van Fossan, in finding for the taxpayers,
emphasized that but for the fire and insurance proceeds there would
have been no distribution.
When these so-called corporate contraction cases are analyzed,
they seem to differ from the usual dividend cases only as to the per-
centage of net worth distributed and in the seemingly irrelevant fact
that stock had been surrendered to the corporation. Were these hold-
ings justified under a statute which called for dividend treatment for
distributions "essentially equivalent" thereto? Perhaps their greatest
support can be found in the choice of the words "partial liquidation" to
denote those situations which Congress intended to favor with capital
gain treatment. The statutory definition was of little aid, and the
semantic connotations of the term would seem to contemplate situa-
624 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 755, 757 (1945). This was a factor which harmed
the taxpayer in another more recent case holding for the Commissioner. See Estate
of Charles D. Chandler, supra note 61.
63 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 755, 759 (1945).
64 11 T.C. 836 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. BuLL. 2.
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tions such as that in Sullivan. No matter how flawless the logic of
those who argued that dividend equivalency was solely a matter of
determining the pro rata nature of the distribution, it is easy to see
how counsel and courts were able to fall into the reasoning that a
dividend was a distribution in the ordinary course of business and
should be regarded as "income" both for tax and corporate parlance,
while a partial liquidation involved a corporate contraction and was
properly considered a "return of capital." The regulations of the
Treasury, indicating that the question was largely one of "fact," did
little to provide that guidance which is the hoped-for function of such
regulations. Moreover, the reasoning of the courts received some
support in the capital gains concept itself-since the distributions in-
volved in a "corporate contraction" often represented earnings accrued
over a period of years it might have been thought that capital gains
treatment was intended. Finally, the legislative history was far from
clear: the Revenue Act of 1926 which finally adopted a rational pro-
vision might have been interpreted either as adopting the pro rata ap-
proach or as intended to fulfill the more limited in terrorem purpose
of preventing utilization of partial liquidations solely to avoid taxes.
Whatever the explanation for those holdings which allowed
capital gains treatment for these distributions in partial liquidations,
the arguments of those who regarded this line of cases as an un-
fortunate exception to a general rule imposing taxes at ordinary rates
upon distributions from a corporation to its stockholders seem per-
suasive. These distributions when pro rata did seem to have the same
effect as a dividend: the stockholders had each received an equal
amount of cash and had surrendered an equal amount of stock; their
relationship to the corporation had not changed. An approach which
utilized only the factor of the pro rata nature of the distribution had all
the advantages of ease of administration.
It was left to the framers of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to
resolve these problems. Two possible avenues were open: the "cor-
porate contraction" concept could have been rejected, or Congress
could have attempted to evolve a statute which would more easily
delineate those transactions intended for capital gain treatment. The
latter course was chosen.
SECTION 346
Section 346 through its definition of section 331's "partial liquida-
tion" provides capital gain treatment in two situations: 65 (a) when a
65 The statute also provides that one of a series of distributions in redemption
of all the stock of the corporation is a partial liquidation. This is surely another
facet of a complete liquidation. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 346.
956 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.109:944
distribution in redemption of part of the stock of the corporation is not
essentially equivalent to a dividend and occurs within the taxable year
or succeeding taxable year in which a plan was adopted; and (b) when
a distribution in redemption of part of the stock of a corporation is
attributable to the corporation's ceasing to conduct, or consists of the
assets of, a trade or business actively conducted throughout a five-year
period immediately before the distribution and immediately after the
distribution the corporation is engaged in the active conduct of a trade
or business which had been actively conducted throughout a five-year
period-provided that neither actively conducted business was acquired
by the corporation within five years in a transaction in which gain or
loss was recognized.
A distribution "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" is not a
self-defining term: some effort must be made to determine what trans-
actions Congress intended to include within the ambit of subsection
(a). When the bill which later became the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 was introduced into the House of Representatives only sub-
section (b) was included.6" In adding subsection (a),67 the Senate
Report stated:
The general language of the proposed draft would include within
the definition of a partial liquidation the type of case involving the
contraction of the corporate business. Such as for example, cases
which hold that if the entire floor of a factory is destroyed by fire,
the insurance proceeds received may be distributed pro rata to
the shareholders without the imposition of a tax at the rates
applicable to the distribution of a dividend, if the corporation no
longer continues its operations to the same extent maintained by
the destroyed facility. Voluntary bona fide contraction of the
corporate business may of course also qualify to the same extent
as under existing law.68
Thus the existing law of corporate contraction-whatever it may have
been-was continued. Why Congress chose to continue this "law"
remains to be seen. The distinction between Upham and other cases
where taxes were levied at ordinary rates is not self-evident in terms of
legislative purpose. Indeed, the congressional purposes which under-
lay the granting of capital gain treatment to those transactions meeting
the so-called "objective criteria" of subsection (b) may be equally diffi-
cult to define. Perhaps some illumination of the congressional pur-
poses can be gained by investigating those situations which Congress
66H.1R 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 336 (1954).
6 7 Senate Amendments to H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 346(a) (1954).
68 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954).
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has defined as partial liquidations in subsection (b). Unfortunately,
these objective criteria are themselves far from clear. 9
The most obfuscating of these is the central core of subsection
(b): the requirement of two preexisting trades or businesses. The
statute does seem to require that there be two businesses, one of which
is liquidated, the other continued. Is every separate operation into
which a corporation enters a trade or business which has been "ac-
tively conducted" within the meaning of section 346?
The treasury regulations provide that: "[A] trade or business
consists of a specific existing group of activities being carried on for the
purpose of earning income or profit only from such group of activities,
and the activities included in such group must include every operation
which forms a part, or a step in, the process of earning income or
profit from such group." " Logically, the investment of funds in
securities would seem to constitute an active business. However, the
regulations specifically provide that the holding of property for invest-
ment purposes does not constitute an active business.71 Perhaps the
purpose of this requirement is merely to deny partial liquidation treat-
ment to those corporations which normally invest their idle cash in
investment property. The Commissioner may have reasoned that
almost every money-making operation results in funds which are
temporarily idle, that these funds are often invested, and that it was
not the intent of Congress to allow every distribution attributable to
the sale of such assets to receive the favorable treatment allowed by
section 346.72 If such were the proper rationale supporting this ex-
clusion, it seems that nonincidental "investment activities" if done
continuously and on a large enough scale would be included within the
concept of "partial liquidation."
It is not clear whether the revenue rulings have adopted this
distinction. In Revenue Ruling 56-554,73 a bank, through loan fore-
closures, had acquired real estate and other assets of speculative value.
The real estate was leased either for grazing or for oil and gas ex-
ploration. The stock of a wholly owned subsidiary which held these
assets was allowed to be spun off. In a second revenue ruling,74 allow-
69 The solecistic nature of § 346 has been dealt with at length by other authors
and this Comment will not attempt to catalogue each of its vagaries. See Chommie,
Section 346(a)(2): The Contraction Theory, 11 TAx L. Rsv. 407 (1956).70 Treas. Reg. § 1.346-1(c) (1955), incorporating by reference Treas. Reg.
§ 1.355-1(c) (1955).
71 Ibid.
72 This reasoning is supported by the other category of assets excluded: land
or buildings used and occupied by the owner in the operation of a trade or business.
Ibid.
73 1956-2 Cum. BuLL. 198 (decided under INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 355).
74 REv. R . 56-557, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 199 (decided under INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 355).
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ing a bank to spin off the stock of a corporation owning certain assets,
an attempt was made to distinguish between investment and non-
investment assets. The assets involved consisted of substantial
amounts of real estate, mineral rights in rural land, a twenty-seven
per cent interest in an insurance partnership, and the capital stock of
three nonbanking corporations. All except the first were denominated
investment assets, and the revenue ruling considered the question of
whether the spin off could be allowed despite this fact. The spin off
was permitted because the "investment assets" constituted only 20x
of the total net worth of 175x.
A few rulings seem in disagreement with the bank rulings. Rev-
enue Ruling 57-464 5 deals with five rental properties which a cor-
poration desired to spin off. The assets consisted of: the corporation's
old factory and a small office building appurtenant thereto; a two-story
duplex building constructed in 1950 at a cost of 200x; a five-room
frame house constructed in 1951 for 50x; and a house acquired in 1955
for 70x and then occupied by the sister-in-law of the president of the
corporation. These assets had a book value of 430x. The assets of
the manufacturing corporation, including a new factory building, had
a book value of 1300x. The service disallowed section 355 treatment
on the ground that the holding of these assets did not constitute the
operation of a separate business. Emphasis was placed not only upon
the fact that the operation of a trade or business contemplated the
payment of expenses as well as the receipt of income but also upon the
circumstance that the property-while yielding a gross income of
20x-yielded little net after the deduction of expenses. Moreover, the
assets were seen as having been acquired either for investment or for
the convenience of the employees. On the other hand, another ruling
allowed a corporation engaged in selling textile products to engage in
a divisive reorganization.76 The asset separated consisted of an eight-
story loft building which the corporation had purchased ten years previ-
ously; for five years sixty per cent of the space had been leased; and
for two years one hundred per cent of the space had been leased. Un-
like previous rulings which have made mention of the expenses involved
and the magnitude of the managerial activities, no mention of this was
made-the ruling reveals only that the gross rental income was
$135,000 and that the net income was substantial. And in Revenue
Ruling 56-512, 71 a corporation engaged in the paper business also
owned mining propery which it leased on a royalty basis. Only
minor payroll and executive expenses had been incurred and the net
75 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 244 (decided under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355).
76 REV. RUL. 58-164, 1958-1 Cum. Bum. 184.
771956-2 Cum. BuLL. 173.
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income was substantial. The ruling held that the distribution of these
assets would not constitute a partial liquidation. Perhaps the result
turned on the fact that the assets distributed were only a portion of
the assets carried on the corporate balance sheet under the heading
"timberlands." However, pulp-producing property would be necessary
for the operation of the paper business and the leasing of mining lands
seems no more an "investment activity" here than that involved in the
bank rulings.
If an attempt to rationalize these rulings results in failure, it may be
because the Treasury has been unable to find any clear line delineating
"investment" from the operation of a trade or business. The Treas-
ury's efforts to distinguish what constitutes a "separate" trade or
business have been but little more illuminating than the effort to define
investment activities. Separateness could be considered to impose a
requirement that the businesses be distinct either physically, or func-
tionally, or both. If a corporation is engaged in the manufacture of
two separate products at different factories and distributes them
through different sales forces, it is obvious that the corporation is
carrying on two businesses. A more difficult problem arises when the
corporation carries on similar activities at different locations; this
question has been squarely resolved in favor of separateness-at least
where the activities at the two locations are complete within them-
selves. In Revenue Ruling 57-334,7s a corporation organized for the
purposes of building, owning, and leasing real estate held three build-
ings. Building A yielded an annual rental of 20X, was acquired in
1944, had a fair market value of 160x, and a mortgage of 100x.
Building B, acquired in 1947, yielded 8x rental, had a mortgage of 40x
and a fair market value of 70x. Building C was purchased in 1952
and had a fair market value of 21x, a mortgage of 14X, and a rental of
3x. The corporation proposed to distribute building A, which was
located in a different city from buildings B or C, to its stockholders.
The service ruled that the separate business requirements of section 346
had been satisfied.
Whatever may be the merits of allowing separate business treat-
ment to functionally identical activities carried on at different locations,
it is clear that extremely difficult judgments arise in attempting to
apply the requirement of separateness to various fact situations. The
vagaries of the Treasury in this respect have been dealt with elsewhere
at length and will therefore not receive further consideration at this
point.79
78 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 240. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.355-1(d), example 8 (1955).
79 See Young, Corporate Separations: Some Revenue Rulings Under Section 355,
71 HARv. L. R-v. 843 (1958).
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Another requirement which can give rise to difficult judgments is
whether the separate business has been carried on for the requisite five
years. In Revenue Ruling 57-492,8o a company refining and dis-
tributing petroleum products had since 1947 engaged in exploring for
oil. Drilling commenced in 1953. In 1954 when oil in commercial
quantities was found a subsidiary corporation was formed. The service
held that the five-year requirement had not been met since the work from
1947 to 1954 had been largely preliminary and had not been producing
income. The apparent criteria offered by this revenue ruling-that
the active five-year business requirement presupposes a going con-
cern-is weakened by Revenue Ruling 57-126.81 There a cooperative
fresh-fruit marketing association had done "very little fruit business
from 1951 to 1956," largely because of the effect of earlier frosts. In
1951 the association began a cotton compressing operation. The
service ruled that a 1957 spin off had satisfied the separate business
requirement. The separate identity of the fresh-fruit division had
been maintained and full-scale operations had been resumed.
It appears that section 346 has not succeeded in clarifying pre-
1954 law. Indeed, even determining the relation that the criteria of
subsection (b) bear to subsection (a)'s more general mandate is
difficult. The only proposition clearly supported is that not all pro
rata distributions will be considered dividends. Subsection (b) itself,
however, imposes so many requirements that it can be persuasively
argued that compliance with its technicalities should be the sole route
to partial liquidation treatment of pro rata distributions. Under this
rationale subsection (a) would be left solely for extraordinary situa-
tions such as that in Imler.8z
The present section 346 seems to have answered none of the
arguments of those who did not favor the "corporate contraction"
concept. The technical requirements of subsection (b) demand diffi-
cult administrative judgments and would seem to be appropriate as
lines distinguishing different rates of taxation only if some rationale
could be offered in their support.
It would be hoped that this rationale could be found by resort
to the writings of those members of the bar most closely associated
with Congress in the revision of subchapter C. Drafting of statutes
within the corporate area requires a high degree of technical knowledge
80 1957-2 CuM. BuLL. 247 (decided under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355).
81 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 123 (decided under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355).
82 There are other pre-1954 cases which found partial liquidations not character-
ized by a corporate contraction. See Brodsky, Partial Liquidation: Definition of
Partial Liquidation and Rules for Determining Termination of a Busitwss, N.Y.U.
15TH IxsT. ON FED. TAx 539 (1957).
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both of the transactions which the statutes are intended to cover and
of the operation of particular statutory provisions. Those possessing
this knowledge are rare and can most often be found among the mem-
bers of the corporate bar. Because of this, Congress has delegated a
large measure of responsibility to this group in the formulation of
subchapter C. In addition to the Subchapter C Advisory Group
established by Congress, the American Law Institute has been en-
gaged in a long-range project aimed at presenting concrete proposals
to revise the Internal Revenue Code. Although the membership of the
ALI group differs from that of the advisory group, the former's pro-
posals are substantially identical to those of the latter. 3 The pro-
posals of the ALI, however, are fully documented and therefore provide
a better basis for discussion.
ALT PROPOSALS IN THE FIELD OF PARTIAL LIQUIDATION
The ALI has vacillated upon the proper treatment of partial
liquidations. In 1952 it assumed the position that any pro rata dis-
tribution should give rise to dividend treatment. Its statement dif-
fered little from that of others who had assumed positions in opposition
to the Sullivan result:
It is very doubtful if the contours of a contraction test can be
prescribed with any measure of success. But even if we assume
that we can define 'contraction,' what is its relevance? By hy-
pothesis the corporation has accumulated profits and is distributing
cash representing some of these profits. The corporation does not
intend to conclude its existence, for the distribution is not one of
a series of distributions in complete liquidation of the corporation.
The shareholders remain as shareholders, their initial investment
is still intact, and their relationships to the corporation and each
other have not been altered. In such a setting, the distribution of
cash should be treated for what it is-a distribution of profits.
The activity at the corporate level which produced the cash and
the motivation behind its distribution are not matters which
should affect this conclusion. 4
When this position was subsequently abandoned the ALI offered
no reasons of tax policy or equitable taxpayer treatment to support
the abandonment but merely stated that it was "felt that where a
substantial part of the business operations is liquidated, the resultant
83 Compare ALI, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROJECT, INCOME
TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (1958), with Hearings on
Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, I and K of the Internal Revenue
Code Before House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
84 Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, A Technical Revision of the Federal Income
Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders, 52 COLUm. L. REv. 1,
37-38 (1952).
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distribution, even though pro rata, should receive capital gain treat-
ment." 8 The Institute then indicated that such treatment was justified
only where the distribution in partial liquidation bore a much closer
resemblance to a complete liquidation than to an ordinary distribution.
The problem for the Institute thus became "one of finding a workable
statutory definition of partial liquidation embodying this approach." 80
The Institute proposed alternative criteria for events meriting con-
traction treatment.
Under the Institute's first approach, any distribution constituting
fifty per cent of the net worth of the corporation, that was pursuant to
a plan to reduce the business of the corporation and attributable to a
reduction of the active business of the corporation, would be considered
an event meriting capital gain treatment."7 As their second "test," the
ALI proposed that the five-year-separate-business requirement be re-
tained with the proviso that the distributions attributable to the ter-
mination of the discontinued business constitute at least twenty per
cent of net worth."8
In adopting a net rather than a gross asset approach, the ALI
pointed out that, were a gross asset test utilized, it would be necessary
to allow a portion of the liquidated assets to be applied to the liquida-
tion of the corporate indebtedness."9 From this fact, the Institute drew
the conclusion that under the gross asset approach one could inflate
the corporate inventory by borrowing funds and then proceed to
liquidate less than fifty per cent of the long-standing business assets
of the corporation plus some of the newly acquired business assets.
Since under a net-worth approach the taxpayer could presumably
accomplish this same result without selling any of the long-standing
assets, it is difficult to perceive how this "avoidance possibility" led to
a rejection of a gross asset approach.
Having stated the rules, the ALI then sets about delineating the
"active business" concept. The term is left without definition "because
of the difficulty of defining with precision a test phrased in such
terms." 90 Regulations are foreseen which would exclude investment
activities, but would include assets not used to earn income directly, as
long as the distribution was attributable to a reduction in business
activities. Exactly what constitutes a reduction of business is unclear.
Liquidation of a captive mine previously used to provide raw materials
85 ALI, op. cit. supra note 83, at 100.
86 Ibid.
87Id. at 105-07.
88Id. at 111-20.
8Id. at 105-06.
90 Id. at 107.
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would not constitute such a reduction of business if raw materials were
subsequently purchased from outside suppliers; discontinuance of re-
search activities would constitute such a reduction."' The ALI notes,
however, that the "Service and the courts may perhaps tend to be
lenient with this type of vague general requirement" where the fifty
per cent test has been satisfied."
The ALI group next moves to the problem of distinguishing cash
which was required in the liquidated business from that which would
formerly have been available for distribution. 3  They note that no
satisfactory formula was .found and therefore leave the development
of criteria to the courts and the Service on a case by case basis. 4 The
ALI frankly admits that it has been unable to determine any means of
deterring those who plan transactions so as to fall within the partial
liquidation classification or who act to expand after the so-called
contraction. 5
Perhaps the greatest deficiency of the ALT proposals is the failure
to articulate the reasons-policy or otherwise-for the "feelings" of
those members of the Institute who favored the "corporate contraction"
as an event meriting capital gains tax rates. The consequences of this
failure are apparent in the proposed draft: difficult determinations are
not made-they are left for resolution by the courts. Distinctions
without any apparent meaningfulness are made determinative of tax
consequences.
SUGGESTED THEORETICAL BASES FOR THE PARTIAL LIQUIDATION
CONCEPT
One corollary of the cleavage between the corporation and its
stockholders is that income which was earned over a period of years
and reinvested in the corporation may, if distributed in a single year,
result in a higher tax than would have been paid if the income of the
corporation had been taxed to the stockholder when earned by the
corporation. Most of the corporate contraction cases represented
situations of this sort. Congress has provided for recognition of in-
come at capital gains rates in situations not too dissimilar from the
partial liquidation. Indeed, the sale of stock may present such an
analogous situation.
Capital gains treatment of stock sales is not predicated solely upon
considerations of mitigating the possible "bunching" of income. The
91Id. at 109-10.
92 Id. at 110.
93 See, e.g., Estate of Charles D. Chandler, 22 T.C. 1158 (1954).
94 ALI, op. cit. .rpra note 83, at 112-13.
951d. at 113-15.
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twenty-five per cent maximum rate for capital gains is far below the
ordinary tax rate of those who are most apt to realize capital gains.96
Perhaps this treatment is justified by pragmatic considerations di-
rected to keeping the capital of those most likely to invest in new
ventures in a liquid state.97 However, these considerations seem in-
applicable to partial liquidations. Indeed, that justification most often
advanced-that the stockholders' funds are freed for investment in new
ventures 9S-might be better effectuated through revenue laws which
operate to cause funds to be invested on the corporate level where they
would most often be placed in capital rather than consumable goods.99
Justification for partial liquidations might be made by parity of
reasoning with the treatment of complete liquidations. According to
this argument, the liquidation of the business of a single corporation
would give rise to gain to be taxed at capital rates; a single corporation
with two businesses should not be treated dissimilarly, for the two
businesses could have been separated in the years of their inception.
The argument does not bear analysis: the liquidation concept is not
predicated upon the liquidation of the "business" but of the corpora-
tion; a single corporation differs markedly from two separate cor-
porations. Moreover, the treatment of complete liquidations as trans-
actions to be taxed at other than ordinary income tax rates seems
justified largely upon the ground that not to so treat it would give rise
to undue disparity between the tax treatment of the stockholder who
sold his stock shortly before the liquidation and the taxpayer who
awaited the liquidation.
A final weakness in this argument-and in the present Code's
approach-is the unfortunate result which its adoption is likely to
have in influencing business decisions. If corporations which have
"two businesses" are allowed to liquidate one business and distribute
9 6 STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM, 86T CONG., lST SESs., THE FEDERAL
REVENUE SYSTEM: FACTS AND PROBLEMS 180 (1959).
97 See Brown, "Locked In" Problem, JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT,
84TH CONG., 1ST. SESs. 367 (Comm. Print 1955).
98 See, e.g., Remarks of Congressman Curtis, in Hearings, .mpra note 83, at
632-36.
99 See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEBT AND TAXATION 148-49
(1927) (Great Britain): "[W]hen a Company saves by retaining part of its profit,
the operation is smooth and simple. In the case of a progressive business the flow
of capital is just in the place where it is required; it is at the growing point of
industry, enabling new needs and opportunities to be met without delay as and when
they arise. This is true of the new enterprising business, which may as yet be making
only small profits, as well as of the established company whose ability to save large
sums for development year by year has given proof of efficiency and power of con-
tinued expansion. There are cases of course where reserves are accumulated out
of a caution rather than enterprise, and are invested, e.g., in the preference shares
of outside concerns, but generally speaking it is true that the income tax, when it
falls upon company reserves, entrenches upon a form of saving which is of special
value to the community."
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funds to their shareholders at capital gain rates, the tax laws would in
effect provide a reward for the diversification of corporate businesses.
Whether such diversification presents the optimum mode of business
operation is debatable, but most would agree that any such decision
should be made upon operating rather than tax considerations. How
often section 346's favorable treatment of two businesses, if thought to
be a permanent addition to the tax laws, would give rise to such tax-
motivated judgments is difficult to ascertain. Certainly an investor, all
other things equal, would rather invest in a business such as that
considered in the real estate revenue ruling 1 00 than one which could
not be so divided. Even if the two-business approach were not
thought to provide this type of motivation, it is difficult logically to
support such disparate degrees of shareholder fiscal responsibility upon
the seemingly irrelevant ground that one corporation has two busi-
nesses and sold one of them, while another corporation had but one
business of which it sold twenty per cent.
Is there any other ground which can be urged in support of
preferential treatment of partial liquidations? Two arguments might
be offered: first, allowing capital gain treatment of partial liquidations
may have a salutory effect in giving corporations more freedom in
disposing of unneeded assets; second, such treatment would take some
of the pressure off the sale or merger of the entire corporation as the
only sure route in certain situations to the realization of accumulated
corporate earnings at capital gain rates. Both of these arguments
draw their justification from the effects which such treatment might be
thought to have upon shareholder actions.
Some authors have forcefully argued that revenue measures should
not be concerned with regulating conduct at the primary level, but
rather that this should be left to other agencies of government.' 1
These arguments have been formulated largely with regard to the
question whether gain should be recognized in corporate mergers;
however, the same contentions might well be made with regard to the
above suggestions. Although one might be able to conceive of an
internal revenue code which had no effect upon day-to-day conduct but
merely raised revenue, it is clear that the present Code does regulate
conduct in the sense that people are induced to act in certain ways
because of the tax consequences attached to their actions. Thus, the
problem for Congress is not simply one of whether it chooses to
regulate conduct, but is-in a section 346 context-one of attempting
' 0o Rev. Rul. 57-334, 1957-2 Cum!. BULL. 240.
101 See, e.g., Brown, An Approach to Subchapter C, in HousE Comm. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., IST SEss., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, COMPENDIUm OF
PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAx BASE (Comm. Print 1959).
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not to place unwitting pressure upon taxpayers to select one, rather
than another, of two alternative courses of action both of which have
business justification.
The present Code's disparity of rates between income in the form
of dividends and income realized upon the sale of stock encourages
stockholders to plan their affairs in such a way that they will realize
upon corporate earnings at capital gain rates. Today this can be best
accomplished through reinvestment of earnings in the corporation, pay-
ment of minimal dividends, and the eventual realization of these earn-
ings through sale of the stock. Thus, because of high rates of taxation
upon dividends, the corporation may find that its stockholders would
be better off through the continued operation of assets providing a
minimal return than through sale of these assets and distribution of
the proceeds in the form of dividends. Of course, if the corporation
has some other need for the funds raised through sale of the assets,
the cash will be retained in the business.
Those who desire to realize upon their investments in small cor-
porations may have difficulty in finding purchasers. Outsiders will
often be unwilling to buy a minority interest in a closed corporation,
and even if the corporation is large enough that a secondary offering
of stock can be made, such an offering is both difficult and expensive
to market.102 Thus the sale will often be best accomplished through a
merger with a larger corporation with the vendee giving only stock in
exchange for the assets of the business. Traditionally, the argument
has been advanced that the best means of preventing the corporate
merger of the type-the small corporation merging into a much larger
publicly owned entity-is to provide for the recognition of gain on
such transactions by repealing the present nonrecognition provisions
contained in subchapter C.'03 Another means would simply be to
allow the stockholders to withdraw funds from their own corporation
at capital gain rates.
If Congress should decide that the present Code places undue
emphasis upon a corporation's retaining assets beyond the point where
their retention is of real use to the business, and also desires to find
an alternative route for pro rata stockholder enjoyment of accumu-
lated corporate earnings at capital gain rates, what type of statute
should be drafted for this purpose? The greatest difficulty encountered
in any attempt to draft a statute dealing with partial liquidations is to
prevent the partial liquidation from becoming a substitute for dividends.
102 Such an offering can cost more than 20% of the cash received for the stock.
Interview With Financial Expert, in Boston, Mass., March 16, 1960.
103 See Hellerstein, Mergers, Taxes, and Realism, 71 HARv. L. Rxv. 254 (1957).
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It is easy to contemplate stockholders investing funds in assets pro-
viding questionable operating returns, if this investment was seen as
giving rise to a sure tax advantage. Moreover, a partial liquidation
will always differ from a sale of stock in that a sale represents a loss
to the stockholder of his proportionate claim against all the income-
producing assets of the corporation, while the partial liquidation will
usually represent the loss of a claim against the least desirable assets
of the corporation.
The tax advantages of investing cash in the expansion of the
corporation rather than distributing it to the stockholders inheres in
the Code's treatment of sales of stock as events giving rise to taxation
at less than ordinary income rates, as well as in the fact that funds
retained in the corporation are subject to tax only on the corporate
level. Thus it is difficult to predict that the possibility of a partial
liquidation giving rise to capital gain treatment would be the operative
fact causing the corporation to invest its funds in ventures deemed
unsound when not viewed through the distorting prism of taxation.
However, a partial liquidation would often present a more immediate
possibility than would a merger in the distant future.
It seems doubtful that a statute can stop these machinations and
at the same time give some validity to the partial liquidation concept.
The present statute does nothing to prevent such transactions, but only
provides a mass of technicalities which may operate to trap the unwary.
A general statute such as that of the pre-1954 law might be adopted,
but since the distinction between partial liquidations and dividends is
tenuous at best it does not seem that such a provision could be rationally
applied by the courts.
The ALI's approach, requiring that some percentage of the worth
of the corporation be distributed, might be utilized. By selecting fifty
per cent of net worth the ALI believed that it had selected trans-
actions requiring such a disruption of the corporation's business that
the partial liquidation would not be utilized as the usual route for the
distribution of earnings and profits. While this might be true for
some corporations, it is certainly not true for all-for example, the
real estate company involved in the revenue ruling discussed above
could distribute fifty per cent of its net worth with nothing more drastic
than a paper transaction. To avoid the complete abrogation of divi-
dend taxation the statute should contain a provision which taxed at
dividend rates the undistributed earnings and profits for a stated
number of years preceding the partial liquidation."' Even then it
would seem that there would be those who would obtain advantages
104 Cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 665, 666.
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from the existence of the partial liquidation. However, these advan-
tages would be more nearly equivalent to those obtained from the sale
of stock.
Should the statute have an independent requirement that there be
a "true contraction" of the corporate business, or that the transaction
not be planned solely to avoid the payment of taxes? Such require-
ments when added to the throwback approach suggested above might
act as an added deterrent to those who merely accumulated funds for
the purpose of later engaging in a partial liquidation. The difficulty
with the latter mandate is administrative-any requirement phrased
either in terms of "business purpose" or "tax-avoidance motive" is
extremely difficult to administer and might often result in erroneous
court determinations. Moreover, such criteria seem antithetical to the
considerations underlying a self-administered tax system. Although
one should not attribute moral opaqueness to the majority of taxpayers,
to require that the taxpayer report his taxes in accordance with his
motivation would strain the moral fibre of even the most virtuous.
On the other hand, a limited requirement that there be a "true
contraction" of the corporate business could be articulated in more
nearly objective form. A lead can be taken from Estate of Charles D.
Chandler,"0 5 where a corporation operated a general department store
consisting of a ladies' ready-to-wear department, men's department,
children's department, and a piece goods department. When the man-
ager decided to resign, the store was sold and a ladies' ready-to-wear
store was opened. The old store had occupied 8,000 to 9,000 square
feet and employed ten to twenty persons; the new store had 1,800
square feet of floor space and employed from four to six employees.
When fifty per cent of the outstanding stock was redeemed pro rata
for an amount fairly representative of its book value, the Tax Court
found that this distribution was essentially equivalent to a dividend.
In so finding Judge Bruce stressed that the questioned distribution had
not been made possible by the sale of the store: the balance sheet re-
vealed that the company had approximately the same amount invested
in nonliquid assets before the sale as afterwards. 6 Judge Bruce's
holding can be questioned-the inventories of the new store were only
$16,409.23 while those of the old store had been carried at $30,412.82
and were sold for $46,592.33; the equation of invested capital occurred
because the fixed assets of the old business had been greatly depreciated
while those in the new store were carried at cost. But even if these
factors should have pressed towards a finding that the liquid assets
105 22 T.C. 1158 (1954).
106 See 22 T.C. at 1163.
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were required in the old business, the approach seems commendable.
Under this view, partial liquidation treatment would be denied where
analysis of the corporation's financial history revealed that it had been
accumulating funds and that the "partial liquidation" had not acted to
free funds for distribution to the stockholders. Thus, as under present
law, some assets could be excluded from those which could be sold in
a partial liquidation. However, contrary to the ALI's conclusions,
if a corporation with captive mines decided that its business could be
better operated by purchasing raw materials on the market, partial
liquidation treatment should be allowed for those amounts which sur-
vive the throwback requirement.
A final problem remains: to what other provision of the Code
should treatment of partial liquidations be correlated? The area most
often advanced in this connection is the so-called divisive reorganiza-
tion. Both the ALI and the Subchapter C Advisory Group make this
correlation in their proposed formulations, 107 as do the present Code
and regulations.' °8 A divisive reorganization occurs when a single
corporation distributes the stock of one or more subsidiaries to its
stockholders. Before the reorganization the stockholder holds the
stock of only one corporation; after the reorganization the stockholder
holds the stock of two or more corporations. The similarity of this
transaction to the partial liquidation rests in the fact that if the share-
holders subsequently liquidate one of the corporations they have
effected the same result as would have been effectuated by a partial
liquidation. In general, the divisive reorganization offers a greater
opportunity for tax manipulation than does the partial liquidation:
under the divisive reorganization the shareholders can divide the cor-
porate assets into separate shells; the corporations can continue to
expand, accumulating income taxed only at corporate rates; complete
liquidation of the corporations can then be undertaken at the moment
most propitious to the shareholders. It might be argued that this
same result could be arrived at through a partial liquidation followed
by a reincorporation. Such would seem to be the case unless the
statute providing for partial liquidations were to provide that the
liquidation must be accompanied by a sale of the assets of the cor-
poration; such a provision would be desirable. The purpose in allow-
ing favorable treatment of partial liquidations should not be to allow
the stockholders subsequently to operate the assets but rather to permit
the disposal of unproductive assets by the corporation.
107 See Hearings, supra note 83; ALI, op. cit. supra note 83.
108 Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 346, with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355.
Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.346 (1955), with Treas. Reg. § 1.355 (1955).
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The argument above might be inverted: because divisive reorgani-
zations are now allowed, partial liquidations should also be allowed.
But the liberal treatment accorded by the present Code to divisive re-
organizations is inexplicable. The historic purpose of the divisive
reorganization and of the reorganization provisions generally, has
been to allow corporations to alter their forms for purposes of busi-
ness efficacy."09 Perhaps the clearest, and only, area where the efficient
operation of a corporation requires both the division of the corpora-
tion and the distribution of stock to the shareholders occurs when the
shareholders desire to divide up the assets and subsequently operate
independent of one another. Such a situation presents none of the
manipulative problems of the partial liquidation. Whether there can
ever be a case where efficient operation of the corporation requires a
divisive reorganization and pro rata distribution of stock to the share-
holders is open to question. Those who favor this tool have spoken
most eloquently concerning situations where a corporation desired to
insulate itself from the risk of part of its operations 11o a result which
can seemingly be accomplished by the use of a subsidiary corporation
without the distribution of any stock to the shareholders.
CONCLUSION
Although one should be suspect of generalizatiofis flowing from
an analysis of a single statutory section, a few tentative hypotheses
regarding the "congenital weaknesses" of the present Code can be
drawn. First, it seems clear that Congress has failed to define
adequately a statutory purpose in granting the partial liquidation
exception to the general rule of taxation at ordinary rates. Given
this lack of rationale, it is little wonder that the various revenue
rulings seem inconsistent. That the partial liquidation concept should
have had such a long tenure without having been either rejected or
harmonized with some congressional purpose would seem to indicate
either that Congress frankly intended to make this an avenue of relief
from the high individual rates of taxation, or that Congress, forced
to rely upon the members of the corporate bar for aid in the drafting
of statutes dealing with situations as complex as those found in sub-
chapter C, has merely followed the recommendations of this group.
Perhaps both conclusions are correct: other sections of the Code
appear to have little efficacy except as avenues of escape from high
individual rates of taxation; "' and the ALl itself has defined no
statutory purpose.
109 See Hellerstein, supra note 103, at 254, 258-61.
110 See, e.g., Young, supra note 79, at 858-60.
1I See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 641-68, 1014.
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It is hoped that if Congress decides to perpetuate the corporate
contraction as a transaction giving rise to taxation at capital gain rates
some rationale will be found for this treatment and that a statute will
be drawn accordingly. If section 346 merely evidences a congressional
judgment that the individual rates of taxation are too high, the section
should be repealed and the individual rates themselves should be ad-
justed. In any event, there is a basic unfairness to other taxpayers
in the existence of meaningless avenues of relief which are not available
to all.
